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Abstract 
We explore here public and private initiatives in technological solutions for educating 
the poor and the disadvantaged in India since the second half of the twentieth century. 
Specifically, we document Ministry of Human Resource Development's project to 
develop an affordable tablet computer, named “Aakash,” as a personal access device 
for digital courses and online learning materials. We approach this case study in 
relation to several educational technologies that preceded it, and with a wider interest 
in mapping a contemporary transition from satellite-based mass education to Internet-
based mass education. We argue that this process cannot be easily seen as a transition 
from unilateral broadcasting to more democratic multi-casting model of 
communication and learning. Specifically, we study the manufacturing process of 
Aakash and the public debates around it, to comment on the nature of state power in 
India, as revealed in its attempts to imagine and develop a digital personal device to 
deliver mass education. 
	   2	  
The Aakash Tablet and Technological Imaginaries of Mass Education in 
Contemporary India 
 
 
Keywords 
Aakash tablet, e-learning, education technology, India, mass education, and state 
power. 	  
Abstract 
We explore here public and private initiatives in technological solutions for educating 
the poor and the disadvantaged in India since the second half of the twentieth century. 
Specifically, we document Ministry of Human Resource Development's project to 
develop an affordable tablet computer, named “Aakash,” as a personal access device 
for digital courses and online learning materials. We approach this case study in 
relation to several educational technologies that preceded it, and with a wider interest 
in mapping a contemporary transition from satellite-based mass education to Internet-
based mass education. We argue that this process cannot be easily seen as a transition 
from unilateral broadcasting to more democratic multi-casting model of 
communication and learning. Specifically, we study the manufacturing process of 
Aakash and the public debates around it, to comment on the nature of state power in 
India, as revealed in its attempts to imagine and develop a digital personal device to 
deliver mass education. 
 
 
 
 
 
[Image 01] 	  
The optimism around technological solutions to the problem of human development, 
including those intertwined ones of access to education and alleviation of poverty, is 
abundant in nineteenth and twentieth century history. Some found reasons to be 
optimistic about vocational education and education in the industrial arts, while others 
found them in alleviating conditions of living such that time could be made for 
classroom instruction. From the call for “occupational education” in the 1854 
educational despatch3 to the demands for “smart schools” and “compulsory vocational 
training” in the Ambani-Birla report of 2000,4 the theme of technological solution for 
mass education for employment and poverty alleviation has had a long history across 
colonial and independent India. It is within this broad faith in education as providing a 
pathway out of poverty, the ability of technological solutions to solve problems of 
distributive social justice, and the increased engagement of the Indian software 
industry in questions of public welfare that the “Aakash” tablet project took birth.  
 
Aakash (Hindi - sky) is an android-based tablet computer the development of which 
was facilitated by the Ministry of Human Resource Development (henceforth, 
MHRD), Government of India, and was championed as a key component of the 
national vision for bringing high-quality higher and secondary education modules to 
under-privileged students across India. The conceptualisation of the device referred 
to, even when not explicitly, the legacy of the “Simputer,” (2002) an inexpensive 
personal computer developed at the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, and 
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produced by Bharat Electronics Ltd., and also to the One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) 
project led by Nicholas Negroponte of the MIT Media Lab. 
 
At Aakash’s birth in 2011, the MHRD announced a subsidized distribution policy 
aimed at college and university students all over India. Suggesting that this was less 
expensive than printing textbooks, Aakash was going to ensure better access to 
educational material and also, crucially, to online instruction. The fourth version of 
the tablet, proposed by the Ministry in 2013, was even more ambitious and aimed at 
making online course content available for high-school5 as well as university students. 
Furthermore, the MHRD claimed that they “wish to develop a technically and 
financially sustainable model to ensure that Aakash reaches every household in the 
country and every Indian is empowered and connected to the 21st century world 
through Information and Communication Technologies.” 
 
The Aakash project has been seen as dying or dead by various observers6 but there is 
little by way of scholarly material to understand its development, changing goals, and 
more so, it’s testing and use. This paper explores Aakash in the historical spirit, and as 
a critical inquiry into the on-going developments of the project.7 We are especially 
concerned with the technological system of instruction and its delivery that is 
assumed, proposed, and responded to by the various actors involved in the making of 
this technological device. We are, therefore, interested in contemporary history, 
history of practice and in further exploring the debate on state power in India after 
independence. Contemporary history of (science and technology in) India remains 
largely the terrain of social science and, to some extent, of STS scholars but largely 
neglected by historians. This becomes increasingly untenable in the digital age as the 
nature of the archive is changing far too rapidly with serious consequences for our 
ability to explain transformation – we must ask historical questions of the recent past 
if even an archive is to be generated.8 We will return to this shortly. 
 
At this stage, we have not explored the perspectives of teachers, students or more 
generally, the consumers of these devices and the audiences of its content. We also, 
therefore, do not work with the differences in levels of education – primary, 
secondary, higher education or adult education, – each of which will have a distinct 
aspect to contribute to the larger story. In this essay, we do not engage with the 
content of (distance) education, but remain focused with making of a particular 
device. More broadly, we have delimited our concerns to the workings of state power 
in projects led by but also supported by the Government of India and the state 
governments. This delimitation is informed by our central concern: we argue that in 
the projects we study, the devices became the desire. In our study of the various 
projects, including Aakash, the contestations as well as the admiration for these 
projects often remained limited to the devices and technical capability. Content, 
quality and the purpose of instruction almost never came to the centre in the debates 
on technical solutions to educating the masses. Experience of these educational 
devices – from television sets and geo-stationary satellites, to desktop computers and 
to personal tablets – have instead contributed to the familiarity of these objects in  
popular imagination of national capabilities and, arguably, consumer culture. 
 
We begin with a brief and not-so-linear history of projects in technologies of mass 
education to survey especially those initiatives that have informed the making of 
Aakash as an affordable educational device. We look at the Satellite Instructional 
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Television Experiment (1975), the Simputer - the first hand-held device developed in 
India (1998), the Hole in the Wall project developed and led by Sugata Mitra (1999), 
the Government of India led EDUSAT (2004), National Programme on Technology 
Enhanced Learning (2003), and finally, a national online education portal named 
Sakshat (2006). The Satellite Instructional Television Experiment itself terminated 
rather quickly, but it led to several versions of television based instruction 
programmes, most notably, the University Grants Commission led Countrywide 
Classroom (1984 -) aimed at higher secondary and university students. There were 
other programmes in the extension education format aimed, for example, at imparting 
horticultural and agricultural knowledge. Instruction in the broadcast-format – even 
countrywide classroom - continues to date, even after the arrival of the internet and its 
becoming the preferred medium also for the Indian state. While satellite based 
transmission has returned to the scene with EDUSAT, the television has not been 
replaced, but certainly shadowed by a variety of internet access and computing 
devices. 
 
Each of the projects that we discuss briefly deserve attention on their own terms with 
a more robust historical sensibility than one could write about a project more recent, 
as Aakash was. We find it justified that we chose, instead, to focus on Aakash because 
of its relationship to the previous efforts – both technical and historical. More so, we 
decided to take advantage of the digital archive that was available, to some extent, in 
the public domain which is not the case for other projects. Though we use the term 
“digital archive,” it is not a formal archive by any stretch of the imagination. We 
searched the internet continuously and via different strategies to find news reports, 
government reports and documents, and commentaries written by various technology 
bloggers and users of the Aakash device.  
 
Documenting the project has been an interesting historical exercise. We have been 
attentive to documents disappearing from their online locations. One remarkable 
possibility for archival research opened up by the internet is the (limited, and often 
uncertain) ability to access materials that are not presently available on a website, but 
were part of it in the past. This possibility allowed us to access a few crucial 
government documents that are not directly available on the official websites any 
more. We have also been attentive to the reiterations and revisions that do not merely 
overtake or shadow earlier documents. They sometimes erase earlier documents 
altogether as digital revisions. We do not have access to personal correspondence or 
internal institutional correspondence relating to the project. We are, however, 
sceptical of that happening as no protocols for the archiving of digital correspondence 
is yet in place with the Government of India. Doing recent history of India is 
becoming an ever more difficult exercise that historians must urgently attend to, if we 
are to make the present ready to have it’s own past in the future. 
 
In Section II, we look at the production history of Aakash through the various 
agencies and decision went into its making. We will follow this up with a discussion 
on the nature of the Aakash project and the questions it raises for contemporary 
history and the expectations of technology in Section III, before we tie up with a brief 
discussion on the nature of technical solutions for educating the masses. 
 
I 
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The first of our cases, the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (henceforth, 
SITE) was a joint project between the American National Aeronautics and Space 
Agency (henceforth, NASA) and the Indian Space Research Organization 
(henceforth, ISRO) to launch a communication satellite and broadcast agriculture-
focused educational content for young and adult learners in rural India. The 
institutional history of this project is traced to the talks beginning in the mid-1960s for 
collaboration between Atomic Energy Commission, and later Indian Space Research 
Organisation, and NASA on one hand,9 and the Education Commission (1964-1966) 
led by Daulat Singh Kothari that, among other things, emphasised linking up higher 
education and adult education with manpower needs of a recently-independent 
country on the other.10  
 
By the late 1960s, the Government of India was interested in strengthening its space 
program as well as in mobilising satellite communication towards attending to claims 
of social justice and infrastructure development. The first agency they approached, in 
1967, was the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) to initially conduct a feasibility study for direct broadcast of television 
programs to terrestrial receivers via satellite. Subsequently, they approached NASA to 
discuss collaboration on the project. The Indian Department of Atomic Energy and 
NASA signed a Memorandum of Understanding on September 18, 1969.11 
 
A NASA ATS-6 satellite thus launched on May 30, 1974, broadcast content from 
August 1, 1975 to July 31, 1976 to 2,400 villages in 20 districts across the states of 
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Rajasthan.12 . The 
project was supported by the UNESCO, the United Nations Development Programme, 
the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the International Telecommunication Union.  
 
The self-stated goal of this project was to make informational and educational 
television programming produced by All India Radio and Television widely available 
to adults in rural India. Programming content included information on family 
planning, hygiene, agricultural practices, social issues, and entertainment. Two 
separate audio channels addressed broadcasting in regional languages. The 
programme has been subsequently seen as a success that is strongly associated with 
the development of India’s then budding space program. 
 
Victoria Farmer succinctly describes the political context informing the technical 
aspirations of a newly independent nation-state: “… [t]he political sphere after the 
Nehru years was increasingly characterized by attempts at consolidation of political 
power at the highest levels of the Congress Party, and part of this broader goal 
included increasing hopes for the role new investments in television infrastructure 
could play in implementing the five-year economic plans, and more broadly in 
promoting a “national” identity compliant with the political centralization of the early 
1970s.”13 Asif Siddiqi extends this contextualisation of the SITE program by looking 
at the exchanges between NASA and the Indian National Committee for Space 
Research (1962) as framed by the strategic interests of the United States to strengthen 
India in the region especially to address the geopolitical imbalance created following 
the Chinese nuclear tests (1964). Siddiqi observes: “If the actual rationale for US 
assistance was obscured from public view, the outcome of the American offer to help 
with satellite television broadcasting perfectly aligned with the plans of those, such as 
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(Homi Jehangir) Bhabha and (Vikram) Sarabhai, looking to establish an Indian space 
program.”14 
 
From a technical standpoint, the mission was a great success. Satellite transmissions 
were successful and paved the way for a rapid global increase of satellite-based 
television viewing. NASA’s objectives for the project were to test the technical 
capability of its ATS-6 satellite and FM transmitter in space and they were 
exclusively involved in the monitoring of the program’s impact. The Government of 
India was attendant to satellite based instruction, but was equally if not more 
motivated by the desire to gain experience in the development of satellites and 
satellite-based technology for the eventual launch of India’s own space programme: 
the Indian National Satellite System (henceforth, INSAT). On the surface, the 
program appeared to offer a stunning technical solution to an enormous problem. It 
appeared that educational programmes on illiteracy, issues of basic hygiene, family 
planning, agricultural techniques, and teacher training could all be delivered relatively 
easily and quickly to every corner of India using satellite communication technology. 
At peak viewing in the earliest months, 200-600 people viewed programming per 
television set, though this declined to 60-80 people per television. In 52% of those 
polled agreed that they could apply what they had learned in their daily lives.15 
 
In hindsight, it is clear that SITE had a significant impact on the development of 
Indian satellite capabilities.16 What is less clear is how much impact the small window 
of programming had on the average viewer.17 Providing electricity – and the 
development of infrastructure to deliver high technology to villages – was seen as a 
critical advancement; at the same time poor power supplies and faulty hardware made 
continuous viewing difficult. Gains in literacy, public information, and in education 
appear to have been vastly over-stated. It was known, in any case, that the variety of 
languages and regional dialects across the country posed a formidable challenge 
towards engaging the population to deliver a single kind of message. Programming 
was not often tested or sent through a pilot program, and was not always well received 
or understood. The most successful programs were strictly informational, and 
occasionally generated further inquiries, but the entertainment program was as a 
notable flop.18 
 
In hindsight, this experiment in satellite-based instruction offered no basis for 
comparing its value with other means of providing information, leave alone, and 
especially, classroom-based instruction. The technical success of SITE reinforced, at 
least within the policy circles, the belief that television could play an important role in 
providing educational programming and resources to the masses. Critical engagement 
with reception of the programs on the ground appears to have been ignored for the 
love of technology. SITE provided the impetus towards an expanded Indian satellite 
and space program, and continues to inform further projects of mass instruction with 
INSAT, and the EDUSAT initiative of late 1990s and early 2000s.  
 
We see proof of this love for technology, as Siddiqi notes, in that the 
conceptualisation of the INSAT programme was shaped by the developmental and 
educational promises of the SITE initiative. He observes that “INSAT was to be all 
things to all people, a virtual technological panacea for the poor that would be a boon 
to both civil and civilian society in India, a new way to use space based on Gandhian 
principles that rejected the competitive model established by the superpowers.”19 The 
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ideological force of this conceptualisation was key to its continued impact on 
imagination of communication technologies in the next decades: through the UGC 
Countrywide Classroom initiative of mid-1980s, Computer Literacy and Studies in 
Schools and Computer Literacy and Awareness Programme also launched in mid-
1980s, Education and Research Network that connected major Indian universities and 
research institutes in a pre-Internet era. In 1992, the revised Programme of Action of 
the National Policy on Education (1986)20 further emphasised the need to upgrade the 
technological infrastructure and solutions being used in primary, secondary, and 
higher standards, such as use of multimedia packages and audio/video conferencing.21 
 
Efforts at mass education through television broadcasting continued (and continues) 
but the next device for mass education – the Simple, Inexpensive and Multi-Lingual 
People’s Computer, or Simputer – came almost two decades after SITE! The decades 
in between saw several programmatic and infrastructural efforts, as mentioned above, 
to bring computers to schools as an instrument of learning, and to connect premier 
universities and research institutes. These efforts were soon integrated into the 
ICT@Schools scheme supported by the central government and initiated during the 
eighth Five Year Plan (1993-98).22 This scheme, and its later iterations, had a strong 
emphasis on digitisation of existing learning resources (available as audio and video 
cassettes) and development of e-content, building capacity of teachers, and 
establishing model “smart schools.” Efforts towards technological innovation, hence, 
took a back seat with questions of content, building infrastructure, and human 
resource training taking the lead. It is not a surprise that the Simputer did not emerge 
from a state-led project but from an autonomous group of researchers working at the 
Indian Institute of Science (henceforth, IISc), Bangalore, a state-funded academic 
institution. Crucially, the device marked early tendencies of the shifts from satellite-
based instruction to Internet-based learning, and from collective learning aided by 
television screens to individual (explorative) learning through personal digital 
devices. Designed to address the “digital divide, social welfare, and contribute to 
human development in India,”23 the idea for the device stemmed from ‘The Bangalore 
Declaration on Information Technology for Developing Countries in the Global 
Village.’24 Important collaborators included, among others, software engineers and 
computer scientists of whom Swami Manohar, Vijay Chandru, and Amulya Reddy at 
the IISc were the key drivers.25 
 
The Simputer was designed to be easily shared amongst multiple users, each of whom 
could store their own data on removable memory cards. A touch-screen interface and 
a text-to-speech synthesizer were designed for use by semi-literate individuals, and 
for those with little or no contact with digital technology. The project goals were 
explicitly developmental – specifically microfinance – and educational purposes for 
use in rural schools. The device ran on a free and open source Linux operating system 
and was entirely designed and developed in Bangalore. Technologically the device 
was considered advanced for its time. It was among the first devices to switch from 
portrait to landscape screens depending on orientation and allowed the use of 
handwriting on every application.26 
 
The non-profit Simputer Trust launched initial prototypes of the device on April 25, 
2001. The initial cost of INR 9,000 was beyond the means of many of the original 
customers, but the device was still marketed to schools and the suggestion was that it 
be shared among multiple rural users. Initial reviews of the device, both 
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internationally and from the Indian government were positive. The device was 
featured as one of the top global technological advancements by the New York Times 
(2001) and universally praised for its emphasis on “bridging the digital divide” to 
under-served populations in India.  
 
Since the initial launch of the device in April 2001, the production of the Simputer 
was licensed to two manufacturers, PicoPeta Simputers Private Limited and Encore 
Software. The device was subsequently shortlisted for several public-funded projects, 
but appears not to have received any of the contract bids at the time. Efforts to 
introduce the product into schools also met with problems, including electricity 
supply, lack of training and creation of user content, and the fear of theft – or desire of 
possession – of the device that kept it from wider distribution among multiple users. 
The device failed to sell many units and was rarely used for governmental or 
educational purposes, and has subsequently been seen as a failure following its initial 
positive launch.27 
 
Critics blamed the lack of state support for the Simputer device being shelved as a 
result of its inability to receive a wider following. The high cost of the device, relative 
to average income of its potential users in India, appears to have also played a key 
role in the failure of the Simputer. Both manufacturing licenses expired in 2006, and 
were not renewed by either company. Even though seen as ahead of its time 
technologically, the Simputer suffered from a lack general support and funding. 
Nonetheless, it has continued to influence the design imagination of cost-effective 
computing devices, as we see in the case of the Aakash project that rejects the laptop 
form for the one of tablet. It also failed to make the proposition of private access and 
learning devices attractive enough for various potential funding agencies, public or 
private. The television sets that were the chosen access device before Simputer, and 
the wall-mounted computers to be shared by groups of students that came after it, 
were both conceptualised around the idea of multiple learners sharing a common 
device. Thus, Simputer not simply pre-empted Aakash in the physical form of the 
tablet computer, but the idea of an individual device for each student, which it shared 
in common also with the One Laptop Per Child initiative that came after the Simputer 
experiment. 
 
The ‘Hole in the Wall’ project was initiated by Sugata Mitra, Professor of Educational 
Technology at Newcastle University, as an attempt primarily to engage children in 
poor localities through stand-alone computer kiosks.28 On January 28, 1999, Mitra 
placed a computer kiosk in a New Delhi slum in order to study, he claims, the impact 
of Minimally Invasive Education (MIE).29 Any person, we are told, was free to use 
the kiosk and children, including many who were computer illiterate and with little 
knowledge of the English language, were encouraged to experiment freely with the 
technology. Within several months, Mitra claimed local children had developed their 
own words for describing basic computing features, displayed an enhanced sense of 
educational curiosity, and felt encouraged to take ownership of their own learning. 
The results prompted the Government of Delhi to set up 30 more of the learning 
stations in a resettlement colony. By 2001, Hole in the Wall Education Limited 
(HiWEL) a joint collaboration between the National Institute of Information 
Technology Limited, Delhi, and the International Finance Cooperation, was 
established. It later expanded its operations to more than 300 learning stations all over 
the country. 
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Mitra claims that this kind of educational intervention, “Self-Organized Learning 
Environment,” is likely to encourage young students and adults to collaborate in a 
more democratic ways than a typical classroom environment would allow. This, in 
turn he argues, could begin to address the spectres of disadvantage in the digital arena 
- the digital divide – that includes access to basic computing equipment. The absence 
of an adult monitor, or a teacher, is claimed as an advantage to encourage spontaneity 
and an engagement with learning especially for those that have few resources to offer 
children and in any case have to contend with teacher absenteeism in government-run 
schools.30 
 
The Hole in the Wall Project and its creator Mitra received widespread acclaim for the 
perceived success of the program.31 More than 30,000 children are covered by now 
extant 300 Hole in the Wall Stations. The Government of Delhi and the Government 
of India have both embraced the program, and the program operates in Cambodia, 
Botswana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zambia. 
 
While few deny the results of the experiment and the potential of the kiosks to offer 
unfettered access to digital technology, much about its impact remains unclear. We 
are aware that boys are are more likely to dominate and benefit from the use of 
kiosks, or how sustainable the kiosks are over the long term, and if they ever can ever 
substitute instruction based learning or education. Without oversight and funding, 
kiosks in several areas have fallen into disrepair and disuse without clear lines of 
oversight. Additionally, the program is becoming more institutionalised and 
dependent on mediators, especially local teachers and administrators, for support, 
which may address issues of service delivery, but is also antithetical to the mission 
statement of the project. 
 
In the last years of the twentieth century we have seen a global shift towards 
computers as the preferred device for the delivery of distance and interactive 
education. The educational technology initiatives of the Government of India, 
however, have remained primarily conceptualised around the television as the access 
device. Although pilot projects in bringing computers to Indian schools had an early 
start with the Computer Literacy and Studies in 1984 – a project led by MHRD, 
National Council of Educational Research and Training, and Department of 
Electronics, the actual classroom experience of the initiative was described by an 
evaluation report as akin to “spectator sport.”32 During 2001-2004, a remodelled 
version of the same project, renamed as CLASS 2000, attempted to introduce 
'computer-based-learning' in one hundred schools across the country, which were to 
be labelled as “SMART Schools.”33 Nonetheless the macro-scale socio-technical 
imagination of remote delivery of instruction and learning remained a television-
centric one, as apparent from the continued support for the ISRO-led projects of 
satellite-based educational content broadcasting throughout 1980s and 1990s. The 
Simputer as well as the Hole in the Wall projects appear to be small bleeps in this arc 
of continued support for broadcast-education. However, these early experiments with 
computers, hand held or wall mounted, as personal and autonomous learning devices 
in contract to the state-driven initiatives to put the computer inside classrooms are 
important precedents for the techno-pedagogical imagination of Aakash. 
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It was in this mode on September 20, 2004, that EDUSAT, a satellite dedicated to 
education and especially to promoting tele-education in disadvantaged areas of the 
country, was launched.34 EDUSAT was a collaborative project between the 
Department of Space, ISRO, and the Ministry of Human Resource Development. The 
idea was first formally proposed by the ISRO in a 2002 report - “Educating the Nation 
– Need for a Dedicated Satellite.” EDUSAT built upon previous technical efforts, 
specifically SITE and the INSAT System that followed. In theory, the entire country, 
including rural areas that have been critically under-served, was covered by and had 
access to the services provided by EDUSAT.35 The project, again, was seen as a 
success from a technical standpoint – the satellite was designed and successfully 
launched into orbit and functioned until 2010. Its place and what the measure of its 
impact on student learning and the education system could be - is yet to be seriously 
explored. Critical examination of service delivery appeared to end with the launch of 
the satellite.36 
 
Programmes like EDUSAT hint at the strong stance taken by the Indian state on 
mobilising developments in Information and Communication Technologies to 
facilitate learning, but scholarly attention and public debate on such programs within  
the context of discussions on the quality of government-funded education services has 
historically been lacking. Without the technical knowledge and facilities to access and 
properly implement the technological solutions provided by EDUSAT, its potential 
impact, especially on the poorest communities with the fewest services, was limited. 
More crucially, the short life span of the program – a mere seven years – combined 
with constraints, technical and social, on the ground limited EDUSAT’s contributions 
considerably. In 2013, Department of Space declared in an audit report that 
“EDUSAT failed to effectively achieve its objectives due to deficiencies in planning 
for the network connectivity, content generation and failure to have a robust 
management structure”37 – impediments that resonate significantly with those cited 
for earlier educational technology projects. 
 
The MHRD was also testing out the possibilities of Internet-based delivery of distance 
in education in parallel to the EDUSAT initiative. In 2003, the National Programme 
on Technology Enhanced Learning (henceforth, NPTEL) was introduced.38 NPTEL 
was based upon a proposal submitted by the five Indian Institutes of Technology 
(Bombay, Delhi, Kanpur, Kharagpur, and Madras) and the Indian Institute of Science, 
Bangalore, to develop openly accessible syllabi and learning resources for more than 
one hundred undergraduate courses in five areas39 alongside courses in basic 
science.40 The IITs of Guwahati and Roorkee also joined the implementation process. 
Inspired by the Open Courseware initiative of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, the goal was to make accessible better training than students were likely 
to get at their own institutions. It served, perhaps, reinforce the elite status of the IITs 
among engineering universities in India.  
 
Soon these course documents were migrated to the Sakshat (Hindi – face-to-face, or 
presence) portal to aggregate online learning resources for students from kindergarten 
to postgraduate levels, including both standard educational and vocational contents. 
This ambitious project was featured as one of the pillars of the National Mission on 
Education during the 11th Five Year Plan (2007-2012).41 The portal marked the 
completion of the conceptual and technological shift from the satellite-based models 
of delivery of educational content, to an Internet-based one.42  
	   11	  
 
From the brief histories of the myriad institutions and devices outlined above, one 
thing is clear: the links between them are not obvious. The field is crowded with 
solutions that indicate at least one suggestion that most have been about capability 
building in engineering and technology, and none have been fully actualised to 
become an important solution to mass education, neither in the eyes of the state nor in 
the public domain. We think it is nonetheless important to discuss this cacophony of 
solutions together for two reasons: the projects claimed to address a similar goal even 
when they conceptualized learning, instruction and, most crucially, education, in quite 
different ways. Together they allow us to examine how the Indian state has thought 
about mass education, in particular, who the state identified as requiring education; 
what the assumptions were behind how learning was accomplished; and finally, to 
explore state power through the assumption that the state is ultimately responsible for 
the education for the masses. The panoply of solutions is testimony to competing state 
and non-state vision on mass education. 
 
This is also a story of building, harnessing, and distributing technological capability.  
From INSAT to Internet-based courseware, these are all experiments that address the 
aspiration of capability at the frontiers of technology and engineering sciences. This 
contributes a partial explanation of why sustainable technological systems of 
delivering mass education did not come to fruition, as even government audit reports 
admit. For that to happen, educational content, its implication for the diversity of 
audiences, conditions on the ground for reception of both the technologies and 
instruction, all would have had to be built into the imagination of the project. 
However, the imagination of the state remained primarily a technological one, and not 
a pedagogic one. 
 
The chronological organisation of the discussion above might suggest a linear 
narrative of changing technologies of distance education in independent India, but it 
cannot be called one of technological learning or even one of building technological 
systems. The goals and scales of the delivery kept shifting across these projects; they 
competed for recognition by national educational agencies; and the technologies often 
did not build upon ones that came earlier but, in most cases, attempted to recreate the 
apparatus of delivery and the actual learning experience itself.  
 
It is not our goal to fully compare the devices but we might usefully juxtapose the 
projects and outcomes. SITE and EDUSAT (and Sakshat) were public initiatives, the 
Hole in the Wall project and Simputer were in their origin private initiatives. Both 
private initiatives grew out of academic contexts and operated on a smaller scale. 
State ownership and control of the delivery devices was clear in both SITE and 
EDUSAT, but that was less evident with the Internet-based devices that arose from 
private initiatives. The connection of both to the space programme and therefore to 
concerns of national security was directly reflected also in the budgets of SITE and 
EDUSAT  - which were massive when compared with the Simputer or the Hole in the 
Wall project. Yet another distinguishing characteristic of the two was the emphasis on 
self-learning in “minimally invasive environments” whereas the state-led SITE and 
EDUSAT were attempts to recreate the classroom situation socially and virtually. 
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It is within this government-industrial-academic complex that yet another device was 
launched to build upon and departed from the above projects in distinct ways. Aakash, 
the tablet that should take premier education to the masses was launched in 2010. 
 
 
II 
 
On July 22, 2010, Kapil Sibal, then Union Minister of Human Resource 
Development, announced the coming of a low cost access-cum-computing device to 
be used by students across India to directly access Internet-based educational 
materials.43 Aakash, as this device was later named, was introduced as a key 
component of an ongoing national initiative to produce and deliver digital educational 
content to students beyond the elite higher education institutes of the country. This 
initiative, the National Mission on Education through Information and 
Communication Technology (henceforth, NMEICT), explicitly focused not on 
provision of primary education to disadvantaged students through digital means, but 
on reducing unevenness in access to and infrastructures of higher education across the 
country. This, it would accomplish through online distance education modules 
(predominantly in science and technology fields) prepared by faculties of leading 
educational and research institutes (such as IISc and various Indian Institutes of 
Technology). This low cost access-cum-computing device thus entered the public 
imagination as a tool of higher education to help the students to overcome the 
academic, professional, bureaucratic, and infrastructural constraints affecting majority 
of non-elite and semi-urban universities in the country.  
 
Aakash, however, did not come to substantially actualise this function. Manufacturing 
and testing of the device was continuously disrupted by process delays and conflicts 
between the various public and private partners. Media reports about Chinese origins 
about the device, or at least the majority of its components, did several rounds, as did 
reports suggesting intra-governmental frictions faced by its champion Kapil Sibal. 
Moreover, DataWind, the British-Canadian company entrusted with manufacturing of 
Aakash, repeatedly failed to meet production targets; devices submitted by DataWind 
for testing were often found to be of sub-optimum quality; devices acquired by the 
Ministry were not successfully distributed among students;44 and early devices made 
commercially available received harsh reviews. This section traces this troubled 
history of conceptualisation and manufacturing of the Aakash device. In doing so, it 
reflects on the evolving institutional arrangements created to undertake this celebrated 
technological innovation project for mass education. 
 
The device announced on July 2010, however, was not the first such project declared 
by the MHRD. Again, there was a precursor to this: a $10 laptop titled “Sakshat” 
(Hindi – face-to-face, or presence), to be developed by a trusted group of technology 
institutes – including IISc, Vellore Institute of Technology, IIT Madras, and 
Semiconductor Laboratory (again) of the Department of Space – to create a 
prototype.45 This laptop was aimed at enabling users to access the Internet, download 
content, and consume and share them offline. When the prototype was made public in 
February 2009, it was found to be a modem fused together with a small storage 
device, and not exactly a laptop.46 The device was dropped and the name “Sakshat” 
returned to signify only the above mentioned national education portal for hosting 
digital learning materials.  
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In response to an offer from a private company to bulk-sell laptops for school children 
at $100, a debate ensued in the Ministry of Human Resource Development 
(MHRD).47 N.K. Sinha, then Mission Director of NMEICT, played a crucial role in 
convincing the MHRD to consider the possibility of developing a similar but 
inexpensive device in India.48 A research team, including hardware and software 
experts, as well as persons with expertise in charting potential commercial 
possibilities of such a device, was set up under NMEICT. The location within the 
Mission determined the purpose of the device from the very beginning: it was 
conceptualised as a tool for higher education, not school education.49 
 
The desired functions of this device were also defined by the NMEICT mandate. 
Hence it was expected to connect to wireless networks, write notes, read e-books, play 
streaming video, run free and open source educational software, and access content 
developed as part of the Mission. Any additional functions were ignored for the fear 
of inflating the price of the device. The response from IT companies in India to this 
(yet another) new project was less than lukewarm. The Ministry decided to approach 
the academic complex - IISc, IIT Kanpur, IIT Kharagpur, IIT Madras, and IIT 
Bombay. These institutions were funded to develop potential hardware designs for the 
desired tablet and to produce prototypes. In their own take on the history of Aakash, 
the Ministry argued that as the prototypes appeared, the prevailing air of scepticism 
began to clear. In addition, comparable commercial devices appeared on the 
international market adding to the enthusiasm for a bottom-of-the-pyramid market of 
less than $100 tablets.50 
 
The press brief circulated at the inaugural of the device on July 22, 2010, noted that 
the fabrication of its motherboard took place at IIT Kanpur.51 The price of the 
exhibited device was declared to be approximately $35, and it was to be brought 
down in the future to $20 and eventually to $10. This reduction in price was expected 
to be achieved through falling hardware costs, and focused research & development 
investments to make the device more efficient, capable, and affordable. The brief 
claimed that the new IIT Rajasthan and a few other technical institutions were to set 
up research teams to upgrade the capabilities of the device.52 
 
Prem Kumar Kalra, then Director of IIT Rajasthan at Jodhpur, claimed that the 
agency to approach the Ministry of Human Resource Development in 2006 for bulk 
marketing educational laptops was the One Laptop Per Child Foundation.53 He further 
claimed that the Ministry then called for an open contest among Indian engineering 
and technical institutions to develop an affordable computational device. The IIT 
Kanpur team, led by Kalra, (at the time Professor and Head of the Department of 
Electrical Engineering), won this bid.  
 
When Kalra was appointed as Director of the newly instituted IIT Rajasthan in 2009, 
the project moved with him54 and transformed quite significantly in the process. After 
the first set of prototypes were created and exhibited on July 22, 2010, the ministry 
decided to discontinue R&D activities, and instead appointed the (newly formed) IIT 
Rajasthan to procure devices through an open tender process. The tender document 
specified the functionalities decided upon by the Ministry, and IIT Rajasthan was 
given the task to test select sample devices, before any decision to mass purchase by 
the Ministry.55 
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HCL Infosystems won the contract. An amount of Rs 30 crore (approximately $6.4 
Million) was allocated by MHRD for the contract, and a deadline of January 2011 
was set for introducing the device.56 Interestingly, the government declared that a 
million of these devices would be distributed during 2011, exactly matching the target 
set by the OLPC Foundation earlier for distribution of XO Laptops in India.57 In 
January 2011, the announced date for HCL Infosystems to introduce the first batch of 
the devices, the manufacturing contract was cancelled. The MHRD claimed that HCL 
demanded “additional, unacceptable conditions,” and did not provide the necessary Rs 
60 crore bank guarantee to undertake manufacturing in the first place.58 
 
A fresh tendering process began again to find a commercial vendor to produce the 
device. Not much was made public about the second tender until the device was 
finally inaugurated in October 2011, although in an interview with the New York 
Times in August 2011, the minister Kapil Sibal announced that he possessed a 
commercially produced model of the device.59 Two months later, on October 5, 2011, 
this device was officially launched.60 Manufactured by the Canada based DataWind, 
the device was co-branded as Aakash – for devices bought by and redistributed at a 
subsidised rate by the MHRD – and Ubislate – for devices sold commercially by 
DataWind61.  
 
DataWind is a company specialising in affordable Internet-access devices founded by 
the brothers Suneet Singh Tuli and Raja Singh Tuli. Prior to production of Aakash, 
they primarily produced for the British market, while their R&D team was based in 
Canada.62 Responding to public speculations and criticisms during 2010-2011 
regarding the possibility of the low-cost-access-cum-computing device being 
manufactured and/or assembled in China, DataWind clarified that assembly of 
Aakash/Ubislate was in fact taking place in India, by the Secunderabad-based (then, 
Andhra Pradesh) Quad Electronics.63 
 
Pre-sales booking of Ubislate tablets, priced at around Rs 2,500, began in December 
2011 through an online portal, and it saw overwhelming demand from Indian 
customers. Within two weeks, orders were placed for over 1.4 million units. 
DataWind's then existing production capacity was grossly insufficient to meet this 
demand. They declared that a plan to expand the number of production centres in 
India, and to also introduce an upgraded model at a slightly higher price (Rs 2,999).64 
During the launch event in October 2011, several students were handed the first 
model of the Aakash device for early usage and feedback. The response of these 
students, however, ranged from moderately lukewarm to heavily critical.65 
 
The procurement process for the first large set of Aakash devices (100,000 units) 
immediately led to a conflict between IIT Rajasthan, who found the supplied devices 
to be sub-standard, and DataWind, who found the testing standards imposed by IIT 
Rajasthan to be impractical (calling it “military-grade specifications”) given the 
maximum manufacturing cost agreed upon by the agencies.66 Rumours that the 
MHRD would discontinue working with DataWind began to proliferate.67 The 
MHRD simply moved the testing and procurement responsibility of the next 
generation of Aakash devices to IIT Mumbai and disengaged IIT Rajasthan from the 
process altogether.68 None of this was anticipated by the makers of the device, neither 
the handover of manufacturing to a private firm not involved in the prototype, nor the 
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resolution of the conflict related to manufacturing standards by removing IIT 
Rajasthan from the project and turning to the private sector. 
 
If the move to privatise the manufacturing of the device originally prototyped by 
public institutions was the first critical moment of this story of the post-liberalisation 
Indian state's approach to technological innovation, then this curious resolution of the 
conflict between IIT Rajasthan and DataWind is the second. Here we see a mode of 
governance of technological innovation that cannot be called a “total” or “planned” 
approach. Instead the state seems to be 'unbundling'69 the innovation and 
manufacturing process – prototyping, manufacturing, testing, and upgrading – so that 
each segment involves a renewed competition among changing sets of agencies, not 
necessarily public or private, under changing rules of competition, from development 
of domestic capability to urgent needs of delivery.70 	  
Deepak B. Phatak, a Professor at IIT Mumbai and head of the Aakash project claimed 
in an interview that the project transfer from IIT Rajasthan to IIT Bombay happened 
over a single meeting.71 Phatak was apparently asked by Kapli Sibal, then Union 
Minister of Human Resource Development, whether he “can do it.” As Phatak 
responded through an affirmative nod, the decision was finalised.72 
 
In March 2012, Phatak took over the reins of the project. Meanwhile, Quad and 
DataWind got involved in a legal battle that led to disassociation of the former from 
the project. Quad alleged that DataWind has not paid up, while the latter claimed that 
the former has violated intellectual property and contract agreements by attempting to 
sell devices directly to IIT Rajasthan.73 The next months saw speculation on the 
imminent closure of the Aakash project all of which came to an abrupt end as the 
second version of the device was launched by the President of India on November 11, 
celebrated as the national education day.74 Media reports surfaced alleging that the 
devices were actually bought by DataWind from several manufacturing agencies 
located in Shenzhen and Hong Kong.75 DataWind claimed that the capacitative touch 
screens, the main new feature of Aakash II tablets, were manufactured by the 
company in Montreal, Canada, while the final units were “kitted” in various facilities 
in China for the sake of expediency, and yet, the final assembly was undertaken by 
VMC Systems (the Indian partner to DataWind after Quad) in Amritsar and Delhi.76 
The controversy did not come in the way of the launch of the device at the United 
Nations headquarters by the Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, who emphasised the 
need for such devices to connect young learners to digital education opportunities.77 	  
[Image 02] 	  
With Kapil Sibal leaving the MHRD in the end of October 2012, the trajectory of the 
Aakash story took another major turn. Soon after taking charge of the office, M.M. 
Pallam Raju, who succeeded Sibal, started re-assessing the Aakash project and its 
objectives. In early March 2013, Raju declared, “Let’s not get obsessed with 
hardware... [t]he overall (issue) is how we enable students. Let the students decide 
which device is useful.”78 Under-production and greatly delayed delivery of the 
devices had troubled the Aakash project from the start. In December 2011 during the 
first procurement phase, IIT Rajasthan received 6,440 units of the device against the 
required supply of 100,000 units.79 
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A report evaluating the NMEICT programme, published at about the same time as 
Raju took charge, highlighted the serious production troubles but also the value of the 
device if it were effectively delivered to the students.80 Raju, perhaps in response to 
the report, appears to have re-considered his position and now wanted IIT Bombay to 
ensure that DataWind met the supply commitment of Aakash II devices81 strictly by 
the end of the month, failing which he wanted to identify a new manufacturing 
agency.82 The target of 100,000 Aakash II units to be supplied to MHRD was met by 
the end of April 2013, and DataWind declared that it would finally start delivering 
devices to those 4 million people who pre-booked the device a year ago.83 This, 
however, did not help much.  
 
In the meanwhile, Rajat Moona, Director General of the Centre for Development of 
Advanced Computing (henceforth, CDAC), declared that the brand name of Aakash 
would be made available to public and private manufacturers of affordable access-
cum-computing devices (against licensing fee paid to the Ministry), provided the 
devices met a minimum set of specifications.84 He claimed that this decision was 
triggered by the discontent of the Ministry as “several companies are driving mileage 
out of its publicity by selling anything in the name of Aakash” (without providing any 
concrete examples of such fraudulent practices).85An inter-ministerial panel including 
members from the MHRD and the Ministry of Communication and Information 
Technology, academics from several IITs and researchers from public technology 
agencies such as CDAC and Centre for Development of Telematics (CDOT), Moona 
added, would develop the minimum specifications.  
 
The first draft of the specification document for the now fourth version of the Aakash 
device was released by the Department of Electronics and Information Technology in 
June 2013 and public comments were invited.86 The actual tendering process of the 
Aakash IV devices, however, got delayed yet again, and began in January 2014 only 
to get further postponed as the General Elections took place in April-May. As the 
Aakash project reached another moment of stillness with an uncertain future, it is 
worth noting how Kapil Sibal’s stepping down as the Union Minister of Human 
Resource Development coincided with the project’s transformation.  The projects 
went from being a device procurement initiative of the Ministry of Human Resource 
Development to market creation and a standardisation initiative primarily led by the 
Department of Electronics and Information Technology, which is a part of the 
Ministry of Communication and Information Technology.87 The deep ties between 
institutional trajectory of individuals and that of the project as a whole, thus, was not 
only limited to academics like Prem Kumar Kalra, but also to elected (political) 
representatives like Kapil Sibal.  
 
III 
 
Throughout the short history of the Aakash device, the verdict of “failed innovation” 
figures prominently – from the early failure of “Sakshat,”88 to allegations of Chinese 
origin of the Aakash device,89 to manufacturing troubles and under-production of the 
device,90 to criticisms of built quality and computing capacity,91 to mistrust and failed 
collaborations between parties involved in its production,92 and intra-governmental 
criticisms of the implementation process.93 Moreover, there remained a continuous 
tension within the government itself regarding the necessity of the project, especially 
fuelled by (and fuelling) the image of the project as being driven by the dreams of a 
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specific minister. At an event in late 2013, Kapil Sibal (then Union Minister of 
Communication and Information Technology, former Union Minister of Human 
Resource Development) admitted, “[the] Aakash tablet was my dream but it was not 
fulfilled, I tried hard... some departments of my government did not support me... 
despite that I continued to strive...”94 This section explores the precise nature of this 
“failure” of the device. Graeme Gooday in an earlier contribution to this journal 
outlined a historiography of “failure”: that “success” or “failure” may not be ascribed 
to the technological object itself in an uncomplicated manner, but must be understood 
in the context of “human expectations [and dreams] of hardware performance and 
distribution.”95 
 
Across early and later reviews of the device,96 this failure is most intimately 
experienced at the material and functional levels of the device. The not-handy-to-use 
aspects have been endlessly noted –unyielding touch screen, lack of battery back-up, 
and a frequently freezing interface. The thingness of Aakash, so to speak, as 
foregrounded in its multiple modes of failure do not necessarily evoke responses that 
address its physical-material qualities. Public responses to the device have almost 
never discussed alternative hardware components and software platforms,97 better 
manufacturing practices, or for that matter, and this most notably, almost nothing on 
the production of the learning materials to be accessed through the device.  
 
Instead, the failure is interpreted in a framework of national aspirations, technical 
capabilities, and the capacity of the government to create and support innovation. In a 
survey of the media discourse around the Aakash device during 2012-2013, Preeti 
Mudliar and Joyojeet Pal found that the discussion was completely dominated by 
themes related to “Made in India, competition with China, with national pride,” and 
the relationship between the “Government of India and Aakash.”98 This metonymical 
travel of the failure-of-the-device as a marker of the failure-of-the-government, 
especially of its ability to innovate, is at the heart of the popular discussion of Aakash. 
This discussion is produced through the grand statements by the government 
representatives,99 as well as by both staunch critics100 as well as champions of the 
device.101 The question of failure, however, presupposes an original act, or promise, 
of innovation that has gone wrong. While the public gestures and statements of the 
representatives of the government and the public institutes engaged in the making of 
the device do suggest that such a failure took place, documents shared internally by 
the MHRD and IIT Rajasthan state otherwise. 
 
A document released by the MHRD during the launch of the Aakash device declared 
that the device was designed by the “design teams” of the Ministry, including the IITs 
that created different early prototypes.102 Nowhere is it clear in the documents that the 
prototypes achieved the targeted ex-factory cost of $35. The device had to be 
designed either at the level of the unit as a whole, that is in terms of specifying its 
each physical components and how they were to be assembled together, or at the level 
of its System on Chip (henceforth, SoC), that is the integrated circuit that contained 
all the computational components of the device within a unified microchip. 
 
The report submitted by the Mission Directorate of NMEICT (under MHRD) to an 
Evaluation Committee headed by Professor Goverdhan Mehta specified that the 
“entire process [of determining the functional requirements of the device] was 
discussed in various sessions at Mr. Sinha’s [Director, NMEICT,] office at MHRD 
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involving teams from different IITs and IISc as well as discussions with component 
vendors,” while the task of preparation of the “formal detailed spec[ification] 
document” was left to IIT Rajasthan.103 The same report also clarified: “It was left to 
the manufacturer of the device to decide specifically which make or model of the 
components were to be used and it would be the decision of the manufacturer whether 
to use some components to which they owned the patents.”104 In sum, neither the 
product design, nor the design (or prototype) of SoC, it would seem, was provided 
neither by the MHRD, nor the testing and procurement agency. 
 
Prem Kumar Kalra, (then Director of IIT Rajasthan), in an interview following the 
launch of Aakash in October 2011 claimed that in giving manufacturing rights to an 
external agency, the research team behind the device failed to monetise their 
intellectual property.105  
 
The report submitted by the same Aakash project team at IIT Rajasthan to the 
NMEICT Evaluation Committee told another story. Here they stated that though IIT 
Rajasthan prepared “detailed documentation of software and hardware requirements,” 
it did not specify the actual design of the device as that would involve “favouring 
some specific chip-set manufacturer and that would have been ethically and 
procedurally a wrong-doing” (emphasis by the authors).106 It is quite remarkable that 
in their submissions to the NMEICT Evaluation Committee, both NMEICT 
Directorate and IIT Rajasthan unequivocally stated that it was not possible to claim 
that Aakash was an “Indian device.”107 The NMEICT Directorate, although, shirked 
responsibility for funding the creation of this non-Indian device, and mentioned that 
“[h]ad IIT Rajasthan been able to fulfil the task given to them, hopefully, an Indian 
designed and Indian owned SoC and device would have emerged.”108 It was important 
to make a device that could be called Indian. 
 
Herein lies the paradox of the device. On one hand, the Ministry stated that Aakash 
was “a unique device” since “[t]here is no other device that offers so much 
functionality at such a low cost,” and on the other hand, this claim for uniqueness and 
innovation was premised upon putting out a public tender that specified a list of 
minimum functionalities, and an assurance for large scale direct procurement by the 
Ministry at a given per unit cost.109 It then appeared that the innovation had been 
attempted (if successfully or not) in the institutional arrangements for manufacturing 
the device, rather than in its design. The institutional arrangements themselves had 
been constantly under scrutiny and revision; and had been reconfigured several times 
disengaging from the corresponding stages of learning on the project. The device 
itself had simultaneously been the central objective of the constant shifting and re-
calculation of this institutional arrangement, and, arguably, the least important 
component of the project that required being 'Indian,' but for its final assembly within 
Indian territory. 
 
Ashish Rajadhyaksha has argued that the NMEICT initiative in particular, and e-
learning projects of the Indian government in general, are driven by the state’s desire 
to de-politicise and create autonomous channels of public communication and 
education so as “to produce the exemplary citizen-subject.”110 He has emphasised that 
e-governance machinery – such as the nodes of connectivity (National Knowledge 
Network and National Optical Fibre Network), content (National Programme on 
Technology Enhanced Learning), and access device (Aakash) – is mobilised by the 
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state as a symbolically sufficient condition of autonomy of the delivery network from 
political, bureaucratic, and social “contaminations.” Rajadhyaksha notes that the 
“NMEICT constituted the technologization of autonomous governance” by bypassing 
an existing nation-wide architecture to deliver higher education, and selectively 
(through tenders, competitions, and institutional and personal linkages) configuring 
the “new” set of actors who would provide infrastructural support, create educational 
content, and provide the final physical interface between the educators, the content, 
and the learners.111 He further argues that in the end the bypassing of existing 
architecture became a primary objective of the project, which in turn obstructed the 
realisation of the project itself.. He quotes from a report on the status of several 
electronic governance initiatives prepared by Balaji Parthasarathy et al112 to highlight 
the fact that actual implementation and functioning of these projects was often 
disrupted by the burden to translate “such symbolic attributes into functioning 
systems.”113 
 
The failure of the Aakash device, can thus be read as the project’s continuing inability 
to live up to symbolic expectations - that is, to live up to the technological desires of 
the state - and not only, or primarily, its technical requirements. In other words, the 
technical capabilities of the device were almost always evaluated in terms of their 
symbolic values: an Indian answer to Western models of affordable laptops or for that 
matter to mark India’s ability – especially as opposed to China’s - to design and 
manufacture computer hardware. The failure of the device - its technical limitations as 
well as its symbolic shortcomings – in a perverse way established the “success” of the 
Indian state in re-defining the “last mile problem” for the delivery of mass (initially 
higher, and eventually secondary and primary) education as one merely of having or 
not having an “affordable access-cum-computing device.” 
 
Shortly after the July 2010 public announcement of this device, Nicholas Negroponte, 
Founder and Chairman of the OLPC Foundation, wrote an open letter to the Indian 
government.114 Congratulating the initiative to develop a tablet at or below $35 
targeted at educational usage, Negroponte warned that instead of projecting the tablet 
as “[India's] answer to MIT's $100 computer,” it needs to be seen in a wider context 
of initiatives in computer-based learning.115 The letter offered six suggestions for the 
initiative, including the importance of the device to not to become a “special purpose 
device” with a strict focus on educational content delivery and consumption. In this 
context, the early official description of the nameless tablet as a “low cost access-
cum-computing device” is noteworthy.116 It is difficult to imagine a contemporary 
computing device without connectivity.  
 
In other words, a contemporary computing device could be said to be necessarily an 
access device to available communication networks. Where does the need for calling 
it an “access-cum-computing” device come from? It comes, perhaps, from the 
hierarchy of priority – the device is primarily an access device, and secondarily can 
perform the function of a general-purpose computer. An archaeological reading of the 
assumptions of learning processes embodied in this device reveals an earlier layer of 
thinking – that of broadcasting educational programmes to television sets via satellite 
connection. Labelling it as “access-cum-computing” frames the object as being 
shaped by the residue of the Indian state's education technological experiences of the 
past, including that of the SITE initiative.  
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This, however, is not to simplistically suggest that the Aakash tablet emerged as a 
new substitute for a television set when satellite-based delivery was replaced by the 
Internet. A shift had indeed appeared – and a significant one at that. This was the shift 
from collective consumption of learning materials to a personal (or individualised) 
one. Unlike the television sets of the SITE programme and others that followed suit, 
where the learners were expected to gather in a group and in presence of an instructor, 
the NMEICT imagined individual learners armed with personal access devices, with 
educational contents and aids, including virtual labs, being made available over 
Internet for self-learning.117 It is this shift in the responsibility of education to the 
individual that is remarkable in this case, and a quality that was not particular to India. 
 
To simply describe the Aakash project’s failure as one due to the unbearable 
heaviness of functions ranging from the technical to the symbolic and political is to 
fall short of a full explanation. Alongside that narrative of failure, it is critical to 
foreground the quiet success of the project in establishing the tablet computer as a 
near-essential and familiarised everyday object for access to educational material. 
There is an alarming accuracy in the MHRD’ claim that the Aakash project 
established a sub $100 tablet market in India – it did, even if it was not for the device 
they wanted to promote.118 The project played an important role in normalising the 
idea of a tablet computer as a necessary instrument for bridging the “last mile gap” in 
welfare delivery (in this case, education), and more widely the idea of a tablet 
computer as a desirable media object. Further, in creating an architecture of education 
delivery that is autonomous from the bureaucracies, hierarchies, and entry barriers of 
the public university system, the state assembled an architecture of content creation 
and access that was intimately coded by the economies of telecommunication 
connectivity, competition for academic attention among creators of e-learning 
contents, and generation and mining of personal usage data.  
 
After the launch of their commercial model in United Kingdom and other countries, 
DataWind recently, in 2014, launched a partnership with Bharat Sanchar Nigam 
Limited, a state-owned telecommunication service provider, to offer free Internet 
access (for one year) bundled with the device.119 DataWind also launched two critical 
cost-reducing measures: the introduction of an independent app store,120 that allowed 
DataWind to charge for software sold to users of Aakash, and the acceleration of 
accessing of web content through pre-processing by DataWind's own servers. The 
latter allowed DataWind to mine and monetise web browsing behaviours.121 It is 
remarkable, but not surprising, how divergent economies have converged to 
determine software running the device, which itself enables the tracking of use, 
including learning behaviour, that further enables creation and extraction of value 
which can be bought and sold. 
 
The normalisation of personal digital devices as the preferred instrument to access the 
electronic world also opened up a space of leisure and consumption beyond the strict 
conceptualisations of developmental use of these devices. Even though the varied 
projects in devices for mass education surveyed in this paper categorically fail to even 
imagine the “wild and everyday” media practices,122 as we said earlier, they were 
nonetheless foundational to the economy of entertainment that has followed the 
introduction of these devices with a vengeance. We are thinking here of devices 
ranging from television sets, to computers, to mobile phones, and now tablets. These 
devices have more often than not taken unanticipated trajectories much beyond 
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original purpose – they have sometimes disappeared completely as devices but have 
intimately shaped core layers of thinking on the problem. The vital impact of the 
Aakash project thus also needs to be read through the popularisation of personal 
digital devices that it unleashed. Responding to a description of the Aakash device as 
“the iPad of the poor,” Suneet Singh Tuli explained that contrary to iPad, the Aakash 
was the “the computer and Internet of the masses.”123 Did this failing technological 
solution which had been unable to solve educational inequalities in India leave in its 
wake new public imaginations and experiences of being digital in India? That is a 
matter for another study. 
 
[Image 03] 
 
Epilogue 
 
We have placed the Aakash project in a contemporary history of technological 
imaginations and solutions for mass education in late twentieth century India. We can 
observe that the Aakash project, as well as those preceding it, have been driven by a 
desire, primarily, to scale up the provision of education. The initiatives towards 
building delivery infrastructures for such mass-scale provision of education has 
almost always been accompanied by a larger desire for developing capabilities in 
space exploration, communication, and computing – the key technologies of twentieth 
century geopolitics. Our study of the manufacturing of the Aakash tablet, and its 
surrounding discourses, foreground the technological imagination of the state after 
liberalisation in India (1991), and its unique arrangements and efforts to create 
domestic capability of technological innovation in a context of globalised production 
and communication networks. We see our role as one of recovering the work of 
technology in the history of education as understood through the interactions between 
the state, academia, and industry. 	  
Two key points about such interactions must be noted here. Firstly, the relevance of 
institutes, in the context of the making of the Aakash tablet, rose and fell as key 
individuals moved from one to another. This is illustrated by Prem Kumar Kalra's 
transfer from IIT Kanpur to IIT Rajasthan, and also by the implications of Kapil 
Sibal's movement from the Ministry of Human Resource Development to the Ministry 
of Communication and Information Technology. This is not to say that such 
personification, as opposed to institutionalisation, of crucial relations and decisions is 
a unique phenomenon of the post-liberalisation era, but to foreground the dependence 
of the technological imagination of the Indian state upon individual champions, as 
opposed to institutional and purely-pragmatic agendas.  	  
Secondly, unlike the celebrated politician-technocrat collaborations of yesteryears 
such as, Jawaharlal Nehru and Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar, Homi Jehangir Bhabha, 
Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis; or later Rajiv Gandhi and Sam Pitroda, a purely 
tactical relationship between political leadership and technocrats (or private sector 
leaders) becomes prominent, often with an explicitly pragmatic focus on getting the 
job done. The relationship between Kapil Sibal and Prem Kumar Kalra is a case in 
point, as is the one between Kapil Sibal and DataWind. Again, this is not to say that 
the history of independent India has not seen a fallout between technocrats and their 
political patrons, but our study foregrounds the increased fragility and continuously 
renegotiated nature of such relationships in contemporary times.  
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Both these points complicate the attempts at understanding the technological 
imagination of the contemporary Indian state as such. What we find instead is a 
number of key individuals who circulate through various nodes of the state structure, 
and shape, in the process, the negotiated manifestations of the technological 
imagination concerned. 
 
Our choice of sources has been determined by our one goal: that of understanding the 
nature of state power in contemporary India at the intersection of education and 
technology. What we found in the myriad detail of implementing a technical solution 
was a messiness which indicates that state power, even when its efforts were less 
eminent (by its own admission), was never complete. When exercised on a shifting 
terrain where technology, the goals of education, and the nature of private investment 
were changing, relevant institutions of the state apparatus often found themselves 
unable to create, effectively control, and deliver durable socio-technical imaginaries – 
even as state power was maintained.124 Seeing like the state appears less compelling 
as a searing critique of the leviathan.125 It is this insight that we consider 
historiographically crucial also to re-examine other state-led and state-supported 
projects in the past. 	  
What is also remarkable in the making of the Aakash project is the marginality of 
discussions on the future of educational content and on curricula. What are the 
possible purposes and futures of industrialised education? In the 1970s, SITE 
appeared less ambiguous about its vision for education – the project wanted to take 
useful education to the rural hinterlands of India. Subsequent technological projects 
have been less clear on educational content. If the goal of the state-led projects is to 
produce a better workforce, then any meaningful debate or discussion of it in the 
public sphere is yet to be found. Similarly, any discussion of the consequences of 
standardised delivery of curricula and the potential to de-skill students and educators 
is rarely raised. The simultaneous creation of this desire for a digital personal device 
and the poverty of educational content indicate at the re-configuration of the mass 
education agenda in contemporary India towards creation of markets for new 
technologies of communication. The device has become the desire! 
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